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SECTION 301(a) AND THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
OF LABOR AGREEMENTS
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act' invests fed-
eral district courts with jurisdiction over suits for breach of a collective
contract between an employer and a labor organization, irrespective of
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. The pri-
mary aim which appears to have motivated this enactment was the
desire to promote more responsible labor relations by making both
parties to the agreement answerable for its breach in federal court.2
The new section was required to circumvent the difficulties involved
in suing unions as unincorporated associations.3
Although on its face the section remedied only this jurisdictional
difficulty, judicial construction has given section 301 a much broader
effect. In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills4 the
union sued under section 301 to compel arbitration of a matter con-
tained in the collective agreement. Unable to find any authority in
either state or federal law upon which to grant relief,' the Court of
1. The relevant portion of the section states:
Suits for violaton of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce . . .may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§185 (1964).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
3. For a discussion of the status of labor unions for purposes of judicial proceedings
see generally Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Cor-
poration, 51 YAu. L.J. 40 (1941); Note, The Problem of Capacity in Union Suits: A Pot-
pourri of Erie, Diversity and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1182 (1939).
4. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Commentary on the decision shortly after its rendition include
Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements,
43 U. VA. L. REv. 1247 (1957); Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era
in Collective Bargaining, id. at 1261; Note, 43 ComE. L.Q. 503 (1958).
5. The difficulty was due to the fact that at common law executory contracts to submit
matters to arbitration could not be specifically enforced. The United States Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), sought to remedy this problem, but the act was expressly made
inapplicable to contracts of employment of workers engaged in interstate commerce. The
Court of Appeals in Lincoln Mills held the collective bargaining agreement was a "con-
tract of employment," and therefore, that the act was not applicable. 230 F.2d 81, 86 (5th
Cir. 1956). Moreover, that court did not view § 301 as yielding anything more than an
expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts. "[1]t does not follow that because jurisdic-
tion is given... there is a new federal law concept that authorizes the courts to enforce
submission to arbitration." Id. at 88.
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Appeals affirmed the District Court's refusal to force arbitration. The
Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas which
held that section 301 was not merely jurisdictional and that "it autho-
rizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforce-
ment of ... collective bargaining agreements. . . ."0 His pronounce-
ment, by permitting judicial creation of a new corpus of federal labor
law, furnished an authority upon which relief could be granted. He
indicated only in broad outline, however, the sources of that law.
"[T]he policy of our national labor laws"7 was to serve as the primary
guide. Provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act were sug-
gested as aids in finding and developing this policy. In addition "state
law" could be used to the extent it was compatible with the purposes of
section 301.
The source of law problem received additional consideration in sub-
sequent opinions. On several occasions the Court attempted to articu-
late more precisely the manner in which federal law about collective
agreements was to be formulated from national labor policy.8 Never-
theless, many lower federal courts have failed to consider the require-
ments of that policy.9 The manifestations of this failure have ranged
6. 353 U.S. at 451.
7. Id. at 456.
8. Typical of the attempt to elaborate on the task of creating federal labor law Is the
following:
The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal
labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness
is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate
of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be de-
cided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.
Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). Accord, Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1962); Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods,
Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 27 (1962).
9. Several factors might be advanced in an effort to rationalize this failure. First,
it has been argued that because national labor policy is not set forth in an easily accessible,
comprehensible form, giving content to that policy is difficult. This problem is even more
pronounced in the area of labor than other fields of governmental regulation. The NLRB,
in contrast to other federal administrative agencies, extensively uses its adjudicatory
machinery, rarely if ever resorting to rulemaking. As a consequence, case by case analysis
may be necessary to ascertain the Board's position on a given matter. This process Is much
more demanding than looking to an agency statement formulated through rulcmaking.
See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Admin-
istrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. Rzv. 921, 940-41 (1965). But see Friendly, The Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. Rrv. 863,
891 (1962). See generally Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961). Second, it has been argued that the creation of
federal law based on national labor policy is an undertaking for which the courts are
institutionally unsuited. This argument has two dimensions. On the one hand, those strains
of labor policy that can be identified may, in any given case, reflect competing aims. On
the other hand, § 301 itself offers no guidance in the creation of labor contract law. As a
[Vol. 75:877
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
from an apparent unawareness that labor policy must be examined, 0
to a token acknowledgment of its relevance." A demonstration of this
latter response appears in Genesco, Inc. v. Joint Council 13, United
Shoe Workers,12 a recent Second Circuit decision. Genesco was a mem-
ber of a multi-employer bargaining group representing several shoe
manufacturers in negotiations to reach a new agreement with a union.
Before all the matters in controversy could be resolved, however, the
pre-existing agreement lapsed, and a strike was called. Shortly there-
after, a settlement was reached. The union signed individual memo-
randa of understanding for each employer. A resumption of work fol-
lowed at all factories but Genesco's. After demanding that the union
end its strike, Genesco brought suit for damages caused by breach of
the no-strike clause in the alleged collective bargaining agreement.13
In reply, the union moved to dismiss on the ground that the company
should be forced to arbitrate before bringing suit. Alternatively the
union claimed that no bargain had been reached. This latter defense
was based on the union's purported imposition of an oral condition
precedent which it claimed had been unfulfilled. Genesco maintained
that its membership in the multi-employer bargaining group, 14 with
consequence, in both situations the courts become involved in a complex, undirected
task of policy-making which they are both unable and unwilling to undertake. See
Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 H. v. L. Rxv. 1, 22-29 (1957). But see Summers, Frankfurter, Labor Law and
the Judge's Function, 67 YALx L.J. 266, 292 n.144 (1957), arguing that courts had in fact
been making just such decisions for many years. For a consideration of judicial per-
formance under § 301, see generally Comment, The Emergent Federal Common Law of
Labor Contracts: A Survey of the Law under Section 301, 28 U. CHL L. Rxv. 707 (1951).
10. Calhoun v. Bernard, 333 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir. 1964); Burlesque Artists Assn v.
L H-irst Enterprises, 267 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1959); Local Joint Exc. Bd., Hotel Em-
ployees Union v. Nationwide Downtowner Motor Inns, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 413, 416 (W.D.
Mo. 1964); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Shawnee Indus., 224 F. Supp. 347, 352
(W.D. Okla. 1963).
11. United Packinghouse Workers v. Maurer-Neuer, Inc., 272 F.2d 647, 649 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); Plumbers Union v. Dillion, 255 F.2d 820, 823 (9th
Cir. 1958).
12. 341 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1965).
13. Jurisdiction was alleged both under § 301 and diversity of citizenship. While it
seems that the case was litigated solely as a § 301 case, the fact of diversity jurisdiction does
not alter the choice of law problem presented. If the action was premised solely on diver-
sity, state law would be applied under Erie. But the state law applied would have to be
formulated in the same manner as federal law in a § 301 case. Local 174, Teamsters Union
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), explicitly rejected the proposition that "the courts
of the states remain free to apply individualized local rules when called upon to enforce
such agreements. . . - The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive
principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute."
369 U.S. at 103.
14. For a discussion of the role of multi-employer bargaining in labor-management re-
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which the union conceded an agreement, precluded the union from
singling Genesco out for the imposition of a special, last minute con-
dition. Viewing the threshold question to be one concerning the exis-
tence of the individual agreement with Genesco, the district court or-
dered a hearing to determine that issue, found for the union, and
dismissed the complaint.15
A unanimous appellate panel, in an opinion written by Judge
Friendly, held that "if the issue is to be determined by applying ordi-
nary principles of contract law, we would conclude that no agreement
between the union and Genesco was reached."' 10 He went on, however,
to deal with Genesco's "interesting contention" that federal law, rather
than "ordinary principles of contract," should be applied. As he char-
acterized Genesco's argument, courts should find a contract to exist
regardless of the parties' intent whenever a refusal to sign a collective
agreement would constitute an unfair labor practice.' 7 To consider
this position, he distinguished between questions of "formation" and
questions of "interpretation." Although he did not fully explain the
reasons for such a distinction,' 8 Judge Friendly felt that courts could
properly "pass on the same conduct as the NLRB might have to con-
sider in the trial of an unfair labor practice complaint"'1 only regard-
ing questions of "interpretation." He refused to use national labor pol-
icy in adjudicating questions of "formation," for to do so would place
state and federal courts even further into "the center of the very area,
the definition of unfair labor practices, which Congress staked out
for the Labor Board .. "20 After expressing doubt that the NLRB
would have found an unfair labor practice, Judge Friendly concluded
that there were no clear radiations from national labor policy which
undermined his initial disposition based on "ordinary principles of
contract law."'2'
lations, see generally Note, Multi-Employer Bargaining and the National Labor Relations
Board, 66 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1953).
15. The opinion of the district court appears at 230 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
16. 341 F.2d at 486.
17. Id. at 487.
18. The explanation Judge Friendly offers for the distinction is not altogether satis.
factory. While he felt that the distinction was unwarranted simply as the result of a
"mechanical view that federal power attaches only when a contract has been made," lie
did think that it had meaning "as a point of substance." Ibid. As a consequence, federal
law ought properly to apply only to the interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
19. Id. at 487.
20. Id. at 487-88.
21. Id. at 489.
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Judge Friendly attempted to avoid the difficulties of deciding in
accord with national labor policy by implying that to do so would
interfere with the NLRB.22 This deference in a section 301 case, how-
ever, is unjustified.23 The legislative history of the section makes clear
that Congress held a contrary attitude about the courts' relationship
to the Board. Congress expressly rejected a proposal that the breach
of a collective agreement be left to the Board on the ground that ac-
tions involving these agreements should be governed by the "usual pro-
cesses of the law" instead of by the administrative process. " Carey v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.205 was decided in accordance with this con-
22. Judge Friendly in part also seems to base his deference on the fact that the Board
has more extensive remedial powers than a court. He states that
[C]ourts would be forced to decree contract formation... in all such cases, although
the Board, with the wide choice of remedies given by § 10(c) of the Act, might
think a lesser sanction appropriate.
341 F.2d at 488. But there are other judicial expressions which seem to contradict this
reasoning. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 249-54 (1959) observed that
[S]ince the reparation powers of the Board, as we observed in Russell, are narrowly
circumscribed, those injured by nonviolent conduct will often go remediless even
when the Board does accept jurisdiction.
Id. at 253. See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 687-88 (1965).
23. Usually, resort to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction aids in a determination of
the appropriate jurisdictional spheres of courts and administrative agencies in instances
where there exists some overlap between the two. For example, Genesco sought to prose-
cute an unfair labor practice charge against the union as well as the § 301 action
for damages caused by the same conduct. In its pure formulation, the application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine would necessitate judicial abstention until an administrative
agency has resolved a question raised in the court proceeding, thereby minimizing the
prospect of conflict between the tribunals. On this view, there would be two proceedings.
one before the NLRB, the other before the court. Professor Sovern, however, after a
thorough consideration of the doctrine as it relates to § 301, concludes
Courts must be permitted to decide contract actions involving conduct "arguably
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act," even though permitting them to do so risW an
occasional decision disserving rights protected by the NLRA and a modicum of dis-
order in administration, because a contrary rule probably would emasculate section
301.
Sovern, Sections 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of NLRB, 76 HAv. L Ruv. 529, 553
(1963). See generally 3 DAvis, ADSwar.nrsv Lw TE sa's §§ 19.01-.09 (1958); Jaffe,
Primary Jurisdiction, 77 Httv. L. Rxv. 1037 (1954).
24. When the 1947 labor legislation was before Congress for consideration, there was
a provision in both the House and Senate versions making the breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement an unfair labor practice subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-23 (1947); HR. R . No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
21 (1947). In conference this provision was dropped and Congress adopted § 301, thereby
relying on the judicial process alone to adjudicate such actions. H.R. Co. F. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
25. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
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gressional judgment. Although it was recognized there that aspects of
the controversy would almost certainly be raised again in a subsequent
Labor Board proceeding, 26 the Supreme Court nevertheless granted
plaintiff's demand for arbitration. 27 In so doing, the Court pointed
out that the NLRB would probably respect the arbitrator's decision. 8
Other sections of the LMRA provide additional insight into the
congressional judgment regarding the respective roles of the courts
and the Board. Section 303 grants a civil action for damages to anyone
injured as a consequence of those unfair labor practices defined in
section 8(b)(4).29 In hearing these suits the court must construe and
apply the same provision which the Board considers in an unfair labor
practice proceeding. Yet with no hesitation the Supreme Court, in
International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,3 de-
cided that "there is nothing in the language of § 303(a)(4) which
makes its remedy dependent on any prior administrative determina-
tion that an unfair labor practice has been committed."," The Court's
interpretation of the statutory provision must have been based on the
conviction that Congress felt no institutional impediments barred a
court from independently considering conduct which might also be
passed upon by the NLRB.
In addition to disregarding congressional judgment, Judge Friendly
ignored the attitude the Supreme Court has taken toward the Board
in some recent decisions. Starting with NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Union32 the Court began to show its suspicion of the Board's ability
to confine its exercise of authority within the proper sphere. As a
consequence, the Court refused to allow the Board to "regulate
the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collec-
tive bargaining," fearing "an intrusion into the substantive aspects
of the bargaining process." 33 Additional indications of lack of con-
26. The union was seeking arbitration of a dispute as to which of two unions' members
was to do certain work. In the view of the Court, a question of either work assignment or
representation was involved. Both of these matters are within the jurisdiction of tile
NLRB; the former under § 10(k), the latter under § 9(c). Labor Management Relations
Act §§ 9(c), 10(k), 61 Stat. 144, 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), 160(k) (1964).
27. The Court explicitly stated that "the existence of a remedy before the Board for
an unfair labor practice does not bar individual employees from seeking damages for the
breach of a collective bargaining agreement .... 375 U.S. at 268.
28. Id. at 270-72.
29. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as
amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
30. 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
31. Id. at 244.
32. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
33. Id. at 490.
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fidence in the Board appeared in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. NLRB 34 where the Court ignored the Board's rationale completely
while devising one of its own. Finally, in NLRB v. Brown35 and Ameri-
can Ship Building Co. v. NLRB311 the Court's distrust of the Board
was made explicit. While acknowledging the respect due the NLRB's
determination of fact, the Court indicated that "the deference owed to
an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia
which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major
policy decisions .... ,37 As these cases make clear, the Supreme Court
is unwilling to rely upon the NLRB even in matters which are ex-
pressly committed to it, such as the definition of unfair labor prac-
tices.38 There was less reason for Judge Friendly to defer in actions on
collective bargaining agreements, since Congress entrusted these suits
to judicial determination exclusively.
Judge Friendly's first mistake in Genesco forced him into a second,
perhaps more serious, mistake. The unwarranted deference prevented
resort to national labor policy, forcing him to rely upon contract
principles as the only alternative source of law. Judge Friendly might
have found these principles in one of two places; choosing either
source raises important problems. On the one hand, he might have
believed that federal law was the source of these contract princi-
ples. Such a belief would have required him to interpret section 301
as being a direction to the courts to make federal substantive law
without reference to the policies expressed in other sections of the
LMRA. But section 301, so interpreted, might be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.39 Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in
Lincoln Mills,40 doubted the legality of delegating power to the courts
24. 579 US. 203 (1964).
35. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
56. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
37. Id. at 318.
38. See Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 84-88
(1965).
39. Since the celebrated case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), which struck down the code-making provisions of the NIRA as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the President, the Supreme Court has not found any
delegation to be beyond the power of Congress. But subsequent cases, in which, attacks on
the propriety of a delegation have been made, were explicit in requiring that the delegation
be bounded by definite and precise standards. Carlson v. Landon, 42 U.S. 524, 544 (1952);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). Presumably, if § 301 were to be attacked
on grounds of being an inadequate delegation to the courts, the requirements established
by those cases to uphold a delegation would have to be met. The inadequacy of guide-
lines accompanying the section, however, might make that task a difficult one.
40. 353 US. at 460, 464-69 (1957).
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to formulate a federal law of labor relations using the provisions in
existing labor legislation as a guide.41 His doubts were not shared by
the majority in that case. The majority resorted to labor legislation
in order to create federal law. However, Justice Frankfurter's view
poses a more serious obstacle in a case like Genesco where federal law
would be created without the guidance of any congressional policy
statement.
Alternatively, perhaps Judge Friendly's contract principles were
based on state law. Considerable doubts concerning the court's juris-
diction would attend this view. Article III of the Constitution extends
the judicial power of the United States to cases arising under the Fed-
eral Constitution, laws, and treaties. Congress must have relied upon
the phrase "Cases... arising under the... Laws of the United States"
to sustain the jurisdiction granted in section 301.42 But if a federal
substantive law is not applied,43 Judge Friendly must believe that the
mere invocation of section 301, as a federal jurisdictional statute, satis-
fies the "arising under" requirement. 44 At least implicitly he would
have to adopt the theory of "protective jurisdiction" as a basis for
that section's constitutional validation.45 Summarized by Justice Frank-
furter in his Lincoln Mills dissent, protective jurisdiction holds
41. Id. at 456-57.
42. Section 301 does not require diversity of citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction.
Likewise, it does not rest on explicit constitutional provisions, nor does it raise ques-
tions involving ambassadors or admirality. As a consequence, § 801 cases must arise
under the laws of the United States. For a discussion of the constitutional problem at.
tending § 301, see Mishkin, The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 157, 184-96 (1953); Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agree-
ment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1955); Note, Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act: A
Constitutional Problem of Federal Jurisdiction, 57 YAr L.J. 630 (1948).
43. The sources relied upon by Judge Friendly in reaching his decision seem to indicate
that he did not resort to federal substantive law. References to state court cases, diversity
cases, Corbin and Williston provide the sole support for his conclusion that "by applying
ordinary principles of contract law . . . no agreement ... was reached." 341 F.2d at 486.
44. There is some authority for the proposition that a federal jurisdiction statute
alone will not satisfy the "arising under" requirement. Cf., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), holding that an action which invoked the Declaratory
Judgment Act did not arise under federal law since the act merely enlarged the remedies
available in the federal courts. Similarly, a statute, like § 301, which affords access to
the courts does not abrogate the requirement that the claim for relief be based on federal
substantive law. But one commentator has advanced the position that § 301 actions, when
viewed within the context of the LMR.A, arise under federal law:
[he act means that such agreements become contracts. If that is so, a suit on such
a contract depends upon the act and arises under it, and so is within the judicial
power of article III without regard to diverse citizenship.
Bunn, supra note 4, at 1256.
45. For a discussion of protective jurisdiction as it related to § 301 see Mishkin, supra
note 42, at 184-96.
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that in any case for which Congress has the constitutional power
to prescribe federal rules of decision and thus confer "true" fed-
eral question jurisdiction, it may, without so doing, enact a juris-
dictional statute, which will provide a federal forum for the
application of state statute and decisional law.
4
G
Since Congress could have legislated a comprehensive code governing
collective bargaining agreements under the commerce power, but in-
stead passed only a jurisdictional statute, the conditions for protective
jurisdiction are met.47 The decision in Genesco, if rooted in state law,
therefore, would raise the question of the propriety of using protective
jurisdiction to sustain section 01.
It is clear that Lincoln Mills cannot be cited to support a theory of
protective jurisdiction, for in that case the Court created and applied
federal substantive law.48 This application of federal common law sat-
isfied the "arising under" requirement of Article III,40 making it un-
necessary for the Court to resort to more attenuated doctrines to
sustain section 301.rO Had the Court dealt explicitly with protective
46. 353 U.S. at 473.
47. An analogous situation in which protective jurisdiction arguably has been exercised
involves § 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 566 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)
(1964). Under that provision, a trustee can pursue in a federal forum a cause of action
arising under and governed by state law. It might be argued, however, that the Bank-
ruptcy Act itself gives the trustee the status to sue in federal court, thereby investing
him with a federal right which arises under a federal law. In another analogous situation,
the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of federal jurisdiction in a contract action involv-
ing a federally incorporated bank. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 US. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824). Subsequently federal jurisdiction was upheld in actions against federally
chartered railroad corporations. Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885). These
cases were held to "arise under" the federal laws even though the matter at issue was
likely to be governed by state law. In both situations, however, there existed the possibility
that an aspect of a congressional enactment might be challenged, sufficient to pose a
potential federal question satisfying article IMI.
48. 353 US. 448, 456 (1957).
49. Judges and commentators have acknowledged the possibility of satisfying Article
III by creating federal common law. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301
(1947), the Court recognized that "there remains what may be termed ...an area of
'federal common law' . . . outside the constitutional realm... ." Id. at 308. Once the
ability to create federal common law is conceded, reference to "laws" in Article II
would encompass both legislative and judicial lawmaking. While no court has yet squarely
held that this body of federal common law satisfies the "arising under" requirement of
Article MI, Justice Brennan, in two dissenting opinions, argued strongly in favor of that
proposition. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 573 US. 647, 663-65 (1963); Romero v. Int'l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959). See Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Prob-
lems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 817, 831-33 (1960); Moore, Federalism and
Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE L.J. 249, 291-297; Note, Federal Common Law and Article
III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YArE L.J. 325, 330-31 (1964).
50. For a consideration of the possible alternative theses supporting § 301 jurisdiction
see Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements under Taft.Hartley Section 301,
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jurisdiction, it would have been rejected for two reasons. First, assum-
ing that the Court would have maintained its position on the desira-
bility of federal courts fashioning a federal law of labor relations, a
holding that section 301 is grounded in both "true" federal question
and protective jurisdiction would require the development of a dis-
tinction between those questions to be governed by federal law and
those to be governed by state law. Yet, neither section 301 nor the cases
interpreting it give the slightest indication that Congress contemplated
this distinction. Moreover, the language of the Lincoln Mills opinion
seems to preclude the bifurcation of that section.
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state
law .... Any state law applied .. .will be absorbed as federal
law and will not be an independent source of private rights.5 1
And second, the need for a uniform federal labor law5 2 would militate
against the application of state law under a protective jurisdiction
theory. A resort to such a theory would yield a body of law which
differed according to the substantive law of the state in which the
federal court was sitting.
The Supreme Court, recognizing the propriety of using federal labor
policy in a suit under section 301, but also recognizing the difficulty
of fashioning proper rules, has employed a federal rule in favor of
the resolution of labor contract disputes by arbitration. 3 Since the
Steelworkers Trilogy,5 4 the Court has construed national labor policy
to require arbitration, whenever possible, to attain the desired goals
66 YALE L.J. 167, 190-94 (1956). This article was cited by Justice Douglas in the majority
opinion in Lincoln Mills immediately after his conclusion that federal law based on
national labor policy must be applied in a § 301 action. 353 US. 448, 456-57 (1957).
51. Id. at 457.
52. See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). That case
involved the issue of whether a state court hearing a § 301 type action should apply
state or federal law. As the Court there indicated:
[T]he subject matter of § 301(a) "is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law."
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.. . . The importance of the
area which would be affected ...makes the need for a single body of federal law
particularly compelling.
Id. at 103-04. But see International Union, U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 86 Sup. Ct.
1107 (1966), where the Supreme Court applied a state statute of limitations in a section 301
action.
53. See Smith and Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The
Emerging Federal Law, 63 Micn. L. Rzv. 751, 757-58 (1965).
54. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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in labor-management relations.r, The derivation of the arbitration
rule from congressional policy statements avoids the delegation prob-
lem inherent in Judge Friendly's reliance upon ordinary contract
principles. In addition, the jurisdictional problem of Genesco is
avoided, since a court is applying a federal rule when it requires
arbitration.
Sometimes, however, the rule favoring arbitration cannot be in-
voked. Clearly, those cases in which the collective agreement contains
no arbitration clause present this possibility. And cases like Genesco,
where the formation of the contract is at issue, cannot be decided by
resort to arbitration unless the arbitrator is allowed to determine the
existence of the collective bargaining agreement. Several serious obsta-
cles may, however, prevent him from undertaking such "jurisdic-
tional arbitration."581
The arbitrator's power traditionally derives from the agreement by
the parties to submit questions to him. Allowing the arbitrator to re-
solve issues of contract formation, however, would reverse this rela-
tionship, permitting him to impose himself upon the parties. Since
the decision of an arbitrator is likely to be conclusive, 7 a court ought
to make certain prior to ordering arbitration that the parties opted
for that method of settling disputes. A consideration of the arbi-
trator's position also weighs against "jurisdictional arbitration." He
may not be a wholly disinterested party. He may be biased to find a
contract exists, for by so doing he can assure himself arbitration fees
in later disputes concerning the same agreement.r8
55. Id. at 568, 585, 596.
56. "Jurisdictional arbitration" is used to indicate that the arbitrator, whose power
to arbitrate must be founded in a contract, must first decide the validity of the document
on which his jurisdiction rests.
57. "It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for, and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his." United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Corp. supra note 54 at 599. See also Wellington.
Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 471, 476-83 (1962).
58. In a somewhat analogous situation, a judge's financial interest in the outcome of
the case was sufficient to render his determination unconstitutional. See Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927). But it might be argued that any decision by an arbitrator, under this
rationale, would be open to suspicion due to the potential fee riding on the outcome.
In a situation like that in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
for example, an arbitrator's decision as to the propriety of contracting out in effect would
also determine whether he was to be the recipient of fees over an extended period of
time. For if the arbitrator finds that contracting out is not within management's preroga-
tive, every time a dispute concerning contracting out arises in the future, he is likely
to hear it as it is prosecuted through the grievance and arbitration procedure. A distinc-
tion can be drawn, however, between the self interest of a judge and that of an arbitra-
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Finally, a recent Supreme Court decision, John Wiley and Sons v.
Livingston,59 seems to support the argument that "jurisdictional arbi-
trability" will rarely, if ever, exist. That case involved the effect of
a corporate merger on the arbitration provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the predecessor corporation and a union.
The latter sought to compel arbitration with the successor corporation
to resolve questions of seniority and pensions resulting from the
merger. The corporation claimed that the arbitration provisions were
no longer effective. A unanimous Court held Wiley bound to arbitrate
on grounds of national labor policy. In so doing, it was clearly stated
that the court, not the arbitrator, was to determine the arbitration
agreement's survival after the merger.60 Similarly, in cases where the
existence of an agreement is at issue, it seems that the court would
also reserve to itself the decision of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.0'
tor. In the former case, the parties have no choice over the tribunal before which they
appear, while in the latter, the parties select the arbitrator fully cognizant of his financial
stake. For a discussion of this difference see Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HAv. L. Rv. 999, 1016 (1955).
59. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See generally Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1459 (1964).
60. 376 U.S. at 547.
61. The case for jurisdictional arbitrability is not, however, without some support.
Although the parties have not clearly consented to the agreement in question, they may
have consented by implication to arbitrate disputes about its existence. Either the past
history or the context of the parties' bargaining might indicate an acceptance of arbi-
tration as the means for determining the formation of the contract. If, for example, the
collective agreement at issue were one of a series in which the parties had always pro-
vided a broad arbitration clause, it could be argued they intended to submit questions
of contract formation to an arbitrator. The series might be temporal, involving a number
of agreements over a period of time with identical arbitration provisions. Or the series
might be spatial in that a number. of different agreements are signed at the same time,
each containing the same arbitration provision. Finally, multi-employer bargaining might
also indicate acceptance if the master agreement and the individual agreements reached
between the union and the employers all contain identical arbitration provisions, In each
of these cases, the arbitration clause in the other agreements in the series afford quanti-
tative support for an inference that the parties are committed to arbitration in the agree-
ment in question. Furthermore, if the parties had often submitted to arbitration disputes
arising in periods when there was no labor agreement in effect, there would be addi-
tional support for the proposition that the arbitrator's jurisdiction is independent of
the contract which he is called upon to adjudicate. Moreover, if these arguments were
accepted, a court could refer the question of formation to the arbitrator, an individual
who is presumably more familiar with the practices of the parties and with labor re-
lations in general. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581-82 (1960) for a traditional statement on the peculiar competence of the arbitrator.
But see Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1034-35 (1965), where
the author argues that in fact the arbitrator may often lack unique knowledge, insight
or expertise.
Regardless of these arguments favoring jurisdictional arbitration, its propriety is by no
means clear. Two reasons militate against allowing the arbitrator to decide the Issue
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When arbitration is unavailable to a court it must develop its own
rules for 301 disputes. 62 There are several factors of which a court must
take account. Since the law of labor agreements is obviously related
to general contract doctrine,6 the first prerequisite to creating such
law is an understanding of that doctrine. Contract principles may
never be applied in the abstract; they are instead root conceptions
which must be selected and modified in accordance with the context
in which the parties bargain.64 For example, the law applicable to
negotiable instruments is unlikely to be suited for collective bargain-
ing agreements, although both are considered contracts. Superimposed
on the negotiations leading to the latter is an extensive set of com-
pulsory national regulations. 65 The notion of freedom of contract,
which has one meaning in commercial law, has a very different mean-
of the formation of the contract in a case like Genesco. First, a judge would be going
beyond present law if he referred such an issue to an arbitrator. John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 US. 543 (1964). indicates the outer limits on the substantive deter-
minations an arbitrator can properly make and that case seems to preclude jurisdic-
tional arbitration. Second, Genesco was seeking damages, not submission of the dispute
to arbitration. Since a request for arbitration was not before the appellate court, there
would be little opportunity for it to make such an award.
62. This conclusion sheds light upon Judge Friendly's distinction between formation
and interpretation. Instead of serving as a vehicle to determine when to refer to NLRB
decisions, the distinction is relevant for deciding when the court itself must develop
federal law based on national labor policy without the aid of arbitration.
63. The role played by general contract doctrine in adjudicating disputes concerning
collective bargaining agreements has been considered by many commentator. See generally
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mica. L Rav. 1 (1958);
Summers, judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Loohing Through the Glass, 2
BuFrALo L. Rav. 1, 19-20 (1952); Wellington, judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471, 475 (1962).
64. According to Professors Kessler and Sharp
a monistic approach serves only to distort the real role which contract has played
in the evolution of our society. It results in more or less lifeless abstractions and
achieves at best a "formal," but not a "substantive" rationality. A realistic under-
standing of the law of contracts can be achieved only through an awareness of the
different functions fulfilled by the various kinds of contract in our society. This
diversity of functions leads inevitably to a polytheism of ideals governing the law of
contracts. A pluralistic approach may help to explain the many... inconsistencies
. . . which cannot be explained satisfactorily under a monistic approach.
Kassmm AND StAitp, CoNmACts 1 (1953). See also Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance
Contract, THE UNrv.srrY OF CHICAGO LAw SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON INSURANCE 1. 6-7 (1954).
Recently, the Supreme Court appears also to have recognized the unique treatment neces-
sary for collective bargaining agreements. Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
In our role of developing... law to govern . . . collective bargaining agreements,
we think special heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to serve.
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 US. 564,567 (1960).
65. Chief among the statutes governing collective bargaining is the Labor Management
Relations Act (raft-Hartley Act), 61 stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
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ing in light of the duty to bargain imposed by the LMRA.00 This duty
differentiates labor agreements from other contracts because it reflects
a policy of forcing the parties to come together and negotiate. An
even more fundamental difference between labor agreements and other
contracts is that in the former the parties are seeking to direct the
course of a relationship which may last over an extended period of
time. To achieve this end successfully requires a good deal of flexi-
bility, so that the inevitable problems that arise from day to day can
be disposed of with a minimum of friction and delay. As a result,
the parties will often consent to be bound by a collective bargaining
agreement even though they do not see eye to eye on every issue. 7
Thus, the standards for determining a meeting of the minds for
collective bargaining agreements may not be found by a resort to Judge
Friendly's "ordinary principles of contract." Although his principles,
applied in the abstract, may have pointed to the absence of a contract
in Genesco, a consideration of the practices of the particular industry 8
may have pointed to a contrary result. For example, if the court found
that the contested conditions precedent were rarely included within
collective agreements, there would arise an inference that the union
consented to the contract as written. This inference would be strength-
ened by the parties' agreement to arbitrate issues related to the
contract.69 For an arbitration provision demonstrates the parties' in-
66. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3)
(1964). See also Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962), where the author states that "The freedom to agree . . . Is not
absolute, for there is a competing concern for the rights of individual employees who are
governed by the collective agreement." Id. at 362.
67. There are likely to be some matters about which parties will be unable to agree
in negotiating any contract. This situation might occur in employment contracts, require-
ments contracts, contracts for extended periods of time, as well as labor agreements. Yet an
agreement may still be reached if there is concurrence on most significant matters. The
extent to which unanimity is present will largely be a matter of degree, varying with the
complexity of the relationship. See Shulman, supra note 58, at 1003-05.
68. Such an investigation can be undertaken on a fairly objective level. In the Fibre-
board case, the Court resorted to "industrial practices in this country. While not deter-
minative, it is appropriate to look to industrial bargaining practices in appraising the
propriety of including a particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining."
379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). It might be contended that only the Board has the expertise to
undertake this kind of investigation. But as Professor Sovern emphatically argued, notions
of primary jurisdiction, often based on the greater expertise of an administrative agency,
have no place in § 301 actions. See note 23 supra. This contention seems to warrant the
conclusion that courts will necessarily have to develop the requisite expertise.
69. The arbitration provision between Genesco and the union reads In part "Any
question in dispute between the parties arising out of or in relation to this agreement
shall be adjusted -.. " 230 F. Supp. at 925 n.l. Clearly, the question of the place of
manufacture is one "arising out of or in relation to" the agreement. Moreover, the no
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tent to be bound even in the absence of unanimity on all issues at the
time the bargain is struck.70
But the courts must do more than apply contract principles, even
principles sensitive to the context of labor relations in which they
operate. Lincoln Mills requires the courts to go further and, in fash-
ioning contract law, promote national labor policies. Chief among
these policies is the promotion of collective bargaining. Support for
this contention can be found in both the original Wagner Act71 and
subsequent Taft-Harley - and Landrum-Griffm Amendments,"0 all of
which sought to encourage unionization 74 and to equalize the strength
of labor and management so that they might bargain together mean-
ingfully. The desire to afford individuals the freedom to regulate their
dealings with one another, which constitutes the foundation of much
of the doctrine of contract law, also underlaid the congressional choice
of collective bargaining as the means to regulate the national labor
market.75 One of the other prominent strains of labor policy is the
desire to preserve labor peace.76 Initially, Congress sought to prevent
bloodshed and violence. Now, however, the aim is to prevent strikes,
boycotts, picketing and other types of concerted activity which may
have an adverse effect on the national economy and breed animus
strike clause prohibits any "slowdown, strike or stoppage of work... pending the deter-
mination of any complaint. .. .' Ibid. These clauses add force to the contention that
arbitration of the disputed matter was appropriate and that an agreement was in fact
reached.
70. See Shulman, supra note 58, at 1007.
71. 49 Stat. 449 (1925).
72. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
73. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrunm-Griffin Act), 73 Stat.
541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
74. The central provisions of the LMRA which serve to promote unionization are those
guaranteeing the right of employees to organize and affording the majority union the
status of exclusive representative of all the employees in a bargaining unit. Labor
Mfanagement Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159(a) (1964). See
also Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODERn L. REv. 73. 277
(1962).
75. Alternatives to private ordering based on collective bargaining were two-fold-
individual bargaining with management or government dictation of terms and conditions.
The former mode of regulating the labor market was undesirable for it had produced
many of the evils which prompted the agitation for change leading to the Wagner Act.
See BmNsTN, THE NEW DEAL CoLr.LErvE BARGAINiNG PoLicy 7-14 (1950). The latter
was also undesirable for it might open the door to government control of the unions.
See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1947); S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong.. 1st Sess.
7 (1959).
76. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 75, at 2. See also Ke)serling. The Wagner Act:
Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 Gao. VAs. L. REv. 199, 216 (1960).
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between employers and employees.17 Finally, national labor policy
seeks to ensure an individual's right to participate in decisions affect-
ing his employment.
78
Although these diverse components of labor policy can be isolated
and identified, labor policy is usually advanced by a decision which
places primary emphasis on the facilitation of the collective bargain-
ing process. 79 The assumption seems to be that maintenance of labor
peace is promoted by allowing labor and management to make their
own decision concerning their continuing relationship. Moreover, col-
lective bargaining is necessary for industrial democracy since it assures
to the membership of the union a significant voice in any bargain
that is struck. And, of course, promoting collective bargaining encour-
ages unionization by elevating the status of the union.
Had Judge Friendly followed the proper procedure in Genesco, he
would not have relied upon his "ordinary" contract principles but
would have sought a solution which promoted the collective bargaining
process. By ruling that no agreement had been reached, 80 in effect he
required that the parties provide in the written instrument for all
possible disputes which might arise between them. Without such ex-
press provisions neither party could, after the Genesco decision, be
sure that the other would not claim it had made an oral reservation
at the time of contracting. Although forcing parties to provide for all
possible contingencies may be appropriate in some contractual situ-
ations, it is unsuitable for collective bargaining. At the time of the
bargaining sessions labor and management have before them a poten-
tially endless number of substantive issues. Requiring each to be dis-
posed of in the labor contract would unduly prolong the bargaining,
with the attendant effect of lengthening the work stoppage called to
reinforce bargaining positions. Moreover, such a requirement fails to
acknowledge the arbitration mechanism, present in virtually every
labor contract, which provides for the resolution of disputes during
the course of the agreement. The widespread use of arbitration indi-
cates the need for flexibility in framing collective bargaining agree-
ment.81
Perhaps the adverse effect which Genesco had on the collective
bargaining process could be justified if the decision substantially ad-
vanced other policies of the labor laws.8 2 Arguably the Genesco deci-
77. See Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
78. See Summers, supra note 74, at 275.
79. See "Findings and Policy" NLRA, 49 Stat. 449-50 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
80. 341 F.2d at 486.
81. See Shulman, supra note 58, at 1004.
82. There are circumstances in which these other goals cannot be achieved through
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sion was in accord with the requirements of advancing labor peace,
for the decision prevented the union from being forced to work under
a contract with which it was dissatisfied. Employees who must return to
work under such conditions might engage in practices throughout the
contract term that disrupt production and harass management. The
prospect of this beneficial effect is outweighed by the certainty of
the harmful effect already mentioned. Similarly, Judge Friendly's
decision cannot be justified by its impact upon industrial democracy
or unionization. These two strains of labor policy are present in the
case only to the extent that they are associated with the promotion
of collective bargaining, which, as already shown, is undermined by
the decision. Thus, had Genesco been decided by considering the dic-
tates of national labor policy, a different result would have been
reached.
Although the analysis of Genesco has dealt with contract formation,
the approach suggested can be used to resolve questions of interpreta-
tion as well. What commends this means of adjudicating section 301
cases is the way in which national labor policy is able to play the
central role in deciding the controversy. Instead of relying upon an
abstract contract principle, a specific solution to a particular case is
sought, and a federal substantive rule is used to decide the case. As
a consequence, the constitutional problems raised by Lincoln Mills
are satisfied. In addition, an analytical framework is established that
enables the judiciary properly to face the policy decisions section 301
demands. Although the task which judges must assume is a difficult
one, it cannot be avoided, for each case decided under that section has
an inevitable effect upon labor-management relations. Unless courts
use an appropriate methodology, they will continue to define the
rights and obligations of parties to collective agreements in a hap-
hazard fashion. Collective bargaining and national labor policy will
suffer as a consequence.
reliance upon the collective bargaining process. A court in such cases must weigh the
impact of its decision upon collective bargaining against the impact upon labor peace,
industrial democracy or some other goal. One situation in which a tension is evident
between the goals of preserving labor peace and promoting collective bargaining involves
"hot cargo" clauses. These provisions require that a consenting employer not handle goods
made in a non-union shop. In effect, they aid the union in bringing pressure on a non-
union employer through the employer who has agreed to the clause. If the provision was
freely arrived at, the promotion of collective bargaining would seem to point to its recog-
nition and validity. But because the enforcement of the clauses tends to expand the area
of industrial strife, must like a secondary boycott, Congress has made the negotiation of
such agreements an unfair labor practice. 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
See also Vellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 112
U. PA. L. R-v. 467, 468 (1964).

